Peace and prosperity: it is worth saving the liberal order
自由秩序为世界带来了什么?
Sometimes a landscape’s contours dissolve into the detail. This is happening now amid the fracturing of the west’s liberal order. Brexit, Donald Trump, angry nationalism and populist politics — all are closely reported and rudely debated. Lost to the cacophony is clear sight of just how much is at stake.
有时大局的轮廓会消失在细节之中。现在西方自由秩序的瓦解就是如此。英国退欧、唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)、愤怒的民族主义和民粹主义政治——所有这些都受到密集的报道和激烈的辩论。在一片杂音之中,人们没有看清眼前的风险。
For all its blemishes, the post-1945 settlement ushered in a remarkable period of relative peace and prosperity. We can all list the mistakes — whether hubris in Washington, corrupt politicians in Europe or greedy bankers everywhere. But for the most part, the story has been one of rising living standards and a spreading politics of generosity.
就算有再多瑕疵,1945年后的全球秩序也带来了引人注目的相对和平和繁荣的时代。我们都可以指摘错误——无论是华盛顿的傲慢、欧洲政客的腐败还是世界各地银行家的贪婪成性。但总体而言,生活水准不断提高,宽容政治不断传播。
Freedom has advanced in step with the absence of war between the great powers. We too easily forget that there is nothing inevitable about peace or the march of democracy.
由于大国之间没有战争,自由逐步推进。我们太容易忘记,和平或者民主的进步并非必然。
We might have noticed also the synergy between a rules-based world order and flourishing open societies. What unites peace abroad with democracy at home is the rule of law. Substitute arbitrary power and states fall to war and societies slide towards authoritarianism. That is why we should shiver when Mr Trump, the president of the world’s most powerful democracy, casually challenges the right of US judges to uphold basic freedoms and disdains international co-operation in favour of America-first nationalism.
我们也可能注意到基于规则的世界秩序和繁荣开放社会之间的协同效应。将国外和平和国内民主连接在一起的是法治。否则,专制权力和政府就会走向战争,社会滑向独裁主义。正因为此,当全球最强大民主国家的总统特朗普随意挑战美国法官捍卫基本自由的权利、支持“美国优先”的民族主义而蔑视国际合作的时候,我们应该感到不寒而栗。
The system established after 1945 was built on US power. But it endured and, after the end of the cold war, expanded because US leadership was embedded in multilateral rules and institutions. Everyone had a stake. Washington sometimes over-reached — in Vietnam or with the invasion of Iraq. By history’s standards, however, the Pax Americana was essentially benign, resting as much on the force of example as military might. 1945年以后建立的体系是基于美国的实力。但它经受住了种种考验并在冷战结束后扩大,因为美国的领导内嵌在多边规则和机制中。它与所有人都休戚相关。华盛顿有时候会越界——比如在越南,或者入侵伊拉克时。然而,按历史的标准,“美国治下的和平”(Pax Americana)本质上是有益的,这既仰赖榜样的力量,也得益于军事实力的支持。
In Europe, a legacy of war between states was replaced by a system that recognised their interdependence. There are lots of things wrong with the EU, but nothing at all when set against what came before. Compare the peace and prosperity of the second half of the 20th century with the barbarism of the first. It was no accident that, once the Berlin Wall had come down, the freedoms available in the west of the continent were grabbed with both hands by the formerly communist nations in the east. 在欧洲,各国间战争遗留的旧怨被承认各国彼此依赖的体系所取代。欧盟有许多过失,但与欧盟诞生前的情况相比,这些过失不值一提。将20世纪后半叶的和平与繁荣与前半叶的野蛮对比一下就会明白这一点。并非偶然的是,一旦柏林墙倒塌,东欧的前共产主义国家就迫不及待地推行了西欧国家的自由体制。
This order, of course, was the creation of the west. The redistribution of power within the global system was always going to impose stresses. Nations such as China have been among the biggest beneficiaries of the US-led open trading system. But Beijing was never going to sign up to liberal democracy or forever abide by rules and institutions of exclusively western design. The challenge was whether the system could be revised to accommodate the aspirations of rising states and contain the resentments of a declining Russia. 当然,这种秩序是西方创造的。全球体系内的权力再分配始终会带来压力。中国等国家一直是美国领导的开放贸易体系的最大受益者之一。但中国政府从不打算接受自由民主政体或者遵守完全由西方设计的规则和制度。挑战在于,现有体系能否做出调整,以容纳崛起国家的抱负,并遏制衰落中的俄罗斯的不满。
What was not predicted was that the rich democracies would turn against their own creation, and the question would become whether they could manage the insurrections within. The textbooks tell us that at moments of global transition established powers such as the US defend the status quo, while rising states such as China seek to upend it. 人们未曾预料到的是,富有的民主国家会与它们自己创造的秩序为敌,问题变成了它们能否控制内部暴动。教科书告诉我们,在全球转型的时候,美国等既有强国会维护现状,而中国等崛起国家会寻求颠覆现状。
History has been turned on its head. With Mr Trump, the US has joined the ranks of revisionist powers, threatening to surrender US global leadership in the cause of economic nationalism. Britain has done something similar by repudiating the EU. Germany and Japan are almost alone in seeking to hold on to the old multilateral order.历史已经被彻底颠覆。在特朗普的推动下,美国加入了修正主义大国之列,威胁要为经济民族主义放弃美国对全球事务的领导。英国也通过退出欧盟做了类似的事。在寻求保住旧的多边秩序上,德国和日本几乎孤立无援。
The charge sheet against western elites is by now familiar enough. Globalisation was rigged in favour of the one per cent. Politicians, mesmerised by markets, conspired in the theft. The incomes of the majority stagnated even as they carried the burden of post-crash austerity. Bankers who should be in jail are still pocketing bonuses. Unchecked migration has heaped cultural dislocation on to the economic insecurities wrought by technological change.
针对西方精英阶层的控诉,现在人们已是耳熟能详了。这些控诉说,全球化受到了操纵,为的是有利于最富有的1%人群。被市场迷惑的政客,成为这宗偷窃案的同谋。大多数人的收入陷入停滞,同时还承受着危机后的紧缩压力。本应该锒铛入狱的银行家仍然拿着奖金。不受控制的移民造成大量文化混乱,使得原本由科技变化造成的经济不安全感雪上加霜。
These grievances cannot be brushed aside. Mr Trump’s xenophobia, the vote for Brexit in the UK and rising populism across Europe have been fed by the complacency自鸣得意 of a political establishment in thrall受制于 to unfettered capitalism. Winning back public confidence requires mainstream politicians to deploy the tools of government — taxation, education and welfare policies, and yes, redistribution — to balance the excesses of globalisation.
不能对这些抱怨置之不理。政治建制派拘泥于不受约束的资本主义,他们的自满为特朗普的排外情绪、英国退欧公投以及欧洲各地崛起的民粹主义提供了诱因。重新赢得公众信心,需要主流政治人物运用政府工具——税收、教育和福利政策,没错,还有再分配——来平衡过度全球化的问题。
No one should pretend, though, that the populists have the answer. Protectionism impoverishes everyone. Demonising Muslims will not make anyone safer. Locking out Mexicans or, for that matter, Polish plumbers, will not raise the living standards of workers in the US or Britain. Closed societies are meaner, poorer and more repressive. Rising nationalism most typically provides a backdrop to wars.
不过,人们不应该装作民粹主义者能提供问题的答案。保护主义会让所有人变穷。把穆斯林妖魔化不会让任何人更安全。把墨西哥人或者说波兰的管道工关在门外,不会提高美国或英国工人的生活水平。封闭性社会更加恶劣、贫穷、压抑。民族主义升温通常为战争提供温床。
Memories are short. In Britain, the Brexit vote has stirred a fashion for rose-tinted spectacles. The 1950s were tough, the story goes, but communities stuck together. There were jobs and opportunities for the white working classes.
记忆是短暂的。在英国,退欧公投让人们纷纷戴上玫瑰色[希望,乐观的]的怀旧眼镜。人们传言,1950年代是艰难的,但各个群体紧密团结在一起。那时白人工人阶级拥有工作和机会。
Breadline wages and slum housing, hotel signs declaring “no dogs, no blacks, no Irish” and cabinet ministers who denounced homosexuality as a “contagious perversion” as dangerous as heroin addiction go unmentioned. Opportunity? University was for a privileged five per cent.
却没有人提及,那个年代只有仅够糊口的工资和贫民窟式的住房,宾馆招牌上赫然写着“狗、黑人和爱尔兰人禁止入内”,内阁大臣公然抨击同性恋为像海洛因成瘾一样危险的“传染性的反常行为”。机会?大学是为享有特权的5%的人提供的。
The danger with nostalgia is that it can blind you to progress.
怀旧的危险在于,它可能让你看不见进步。